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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

(1)

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (22 Mar 67) FOR OT

24 March 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon.

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AD 82580

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

1 Incl
a/s

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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REPORT
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(Continued on page 2)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON
APO San Francisco 96307

AVCA SGN-GO


16 December 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
APO 96307

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army (ACS FOR, DA)
Washington D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1966 is forwarded in accordance with Army Regulation 1-19 and USARV Regulation 870-2.
2. This Operational Report supersedes report submitted on 15 November 1966.



1 Incl
Operational Report

GILEBERT P. LEVY
Colonel, OrdC
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON

Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

SECTION I - "SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES"

1. **MISSION:** The mission of the United States Army Support Command, Saigon is to provide logistical support to US and Free World Military Assistance Forces located in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones, Republic of Vietnam. Supported troop strength totals over 147,000.

2. **PERSONNEL:**

a. Assigned personnel strength rose during this reporting period. The command strength as of 31 July 1966 was 422 Officers, 70 Warrant Officers and 7,215 Enlisted personnel. Strength at the end of the reporting period consists of 553 Officers, 92 Warrant Officers and 10,080 Enlisted personnel.

b. Civic Action:

(1) This command is presently sponsoring three orphanages, two refugee camps, one hospital and a variety of small community relations projects, ranging from teaching English classes to donations of food, money and clothing to needy Vietnamese. Additionally, the command employs over 4,000 Vietnamese civilians.

(2) A total of \$195,157 VN was donated, through payday and church collections, to various schools, orphanages and hospitals. Over 1,100 Vietnamese nationals received medical aid. Transportation support was provided to haul 81 tons of scrap lumber and building materials for welfare organizations.

(3) Through the Eureka, California - Vung Tau, Vietnam "Sister City" Project, 88,000 pounds of food stuffs and clothing were received and distributed to the people of Vung Tau.

(4) The emergency ward of the Cho Ray hospital was completely scrubbed and painted as the first step of an intensified program of support for the hospital by this command.

c. Chaplain:

(1) During the period new chapels were completed at the 64th Quartermaster Battalion, Long Binh, II Field Force, Vietnam, Bien Hoa, 1st Infantry Division, Di An, and 56th Artillery Battalion, Bien Hoa. Others are under construction, at the Post Stockade, Long Binh, 173d Airborne Brigade, Bien Hoa, and the 264th S&S Battalion, Saigon.

Inclosure 1

Operational Report (Cont'd)

(2) Chapel Services conducted during the period is as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number Services</u>	<u>Attendance</u>
August	218	6,631
September	228	7,021
October	<u>373</u> 819	<u>12,025</u> <u>25,677</u>

(3) The Staff Chaplain was assigned the responsibility for monitoring all chaplain supply requisitions in the III and IV Corps areas by 1st Logistical Command. The policy regarding Chaplain Supplies and requisitioning procedures was implemented by correspondence from this headquarters through technical channels to chaplain requisitioners in our area of logistical responsibility.

(4) As a result of policy established by 1st Logistical Command, only the seven most frequently requisitioned chaplain supply items are to be stocked in Vietnam. In addition to the seven, forty-one additional line items are authorized for requisition in Vietnam. As a result, a greater length of time will be required to procure the forty-one items. Chaplains who requisition supplies have been advised of this fact and urged to plan ahead so that shortages resulting from a lack or prior planning will not occur.

d. Public Information:

(1) A total of 2,556 releases were generated by the PIO office during the reporting period, for an increase of 71.2 per cent over the previous reporting period. The following is a breakdown of releases:

<u>Type of Release</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
DA Form 1526*	615	672	972	2,259
News Releases	8	24	10	42
Hometown Photos	8	78	132	218
News Photos	7	12	18	37
TOT.L	<u>638</u>	<u>786</u>	<u>1132</u>	<u>2,556</u>

*Information for Hometown News Release

(2) A two-page command newspaper, the HI-LITE, was published every second week and distributed throughout the command.

(3) Information specialists assigned to this office escorted

Operational Report (Cont'd)

and assisted working members of the Saigon press corps in covering numerous news and feature stories within the command. Media outlets receiving assistance from this office during the reporting period included AP, UPI, NBC, ABC, CBS, German Television News and others.

e. Special Services: Participation by military personnel in the Command's Special Service program indicates a well utilized balanced program. The following statistics reflect average monthly usage for the period:

(1) Motion Pictures - 785 showings with a total attendance of 97,000.

(2) Entertainment - 35 professional and locally produced shows with total attendance of 6,500.

(3) Sports - 37,700 participated in various sporting activities. Vung Tau beach provided recreation facilities for 15,000.

(4) Libraries - 47,000 books, magazines, and periodicals were circulated during the period.

f. Safety: During this period accident exposure amounted to 843,962 military mandays and 5,317,017 miles driven. The number of accidents/injuries and rate for each category are indicated below:

(1) Army motor vehicles - 51 recordable accidents with a rate of 0.96 accidents per 100,000 miles driven. Primary causes were vehicles following too closely and driving too fast for road conditions.

(2) Military disabling injuries - 17 injuries with a rate of 2.01 accidents per 100,000 mandays exposure, leading causes were Army motor vehicle accidents and personnel struck by moving objects.

(3) Local National injuries - 29 injuries with a rate of 0.55 per 100,000 miles driven. Leading cause was Army motor vehicles accidents.

(4) Local National fatalities - 11 deaths with a rate of 0.21 per 100,000 miles driven. Leading cause was Army motor vehicles accidents.

3. OPERATIONS:

a. The United States Army Support Command, Saigon and all subordinate organizations engaged in normal combat zone support operations for a total of ninety-two days during this quarterly reporting period.

b. During the report period the Transportation Motor Pool drove 1,350,000 miles. The motor pool decreased its vehicle fleet from 725 vehicles on 1 August 1966 to 655 vehicles on 31 October 1966. This was due to the lateral transfer of vehicles as directed by higher headquarters.

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c. The Transportation Motor Pool has been the target of VC harassment during the report period. 1 VN employee was killed on 17 August by VC terrorists along with 1 vehicle destroyed. The majority of incidents have been harassing sniper fire, fired at random into the motor pool area.

d. The Vietnamese civilian contract trucks moved 125,658 S/T during the report period. These trucks consist mainly of flatbed cargo trucks and dump trucks. The 48th Transportation Group was committed and moved 185,396 S/T and 32,877 passengers.

e. During the period USASUPCOM, Saigon effectively supported the following major tactical and staging operations:

Toledo	12 Aug - 6 Sep	Support of 173 Abn Bde
Shenandoah	11 Oct - 31 Oct	Support of 1st Inf Div with two forward supply points
Blue Jay & Oahu	1 Aug - 12 Sep	Support of search and destroy mission by 25th Inf Div - Staging of 196th Lt Inf Bde (Sep)
El Paso II	Jul - Aug	Support of search and destroy mission by 1st Inf Div
Aurora I & II	Jul - Aug	Support of search and destroy mission by 25th Inf Div
Kahana	Jul - Aug	Support of search and destroy mission by 25th Inf Div
Meadowlark	6 Sep - 2 Oct	Staging of 11 ACR
Robin	4 Oct through period	Staging of 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
Wren	16 Aug - 19 Oct	Staging of Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam

f. Logistical Contingency Planning:

(1) In the latter part of October the plans branch received 1st Log's OPLAN 34-66, Continuity of Supply (U). After clarification of a few minor points, the plan was being prepared for publication at the end of the period.

(2) Support of Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKVF). USASUPCOM, Saigon published OPLAN 30-66 at the end of October. This plan was a revision of the old ROKVF plan and provides support concepts for the ROK Forces, Vietnam, located in the III CTZ.

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g. Development of USASUPCOM, Saigon Station List:

(1) On 20 October 1966, USASUPCOM, Saigon published a station list, which reflected all "units supported by the command, their locations, and strength.

(2) The station list has aided in determining support requirements within the III and IV CTZ.

(3) Each quarter, the list will be revised in order to keep current information on record.

4. ORGANIZATION:

a. The task organization for accomplishment of the assigned mission includes two major TD organizations (US Army Support Command, Saigon; Vung Tau Sub-Area Command) and TOE organizations consisting of two groups, one field depot, ten battalions, forty-three companies and fifty-three detachments. The combined total assigned strength of the command is 553 Officers, 92 Warrant Officers and 10,080 Enlisted personnel. The combined total authorized strength of the command is 590 Officers, 110 Warrant Officers, and 9,852 Enlisted personnel. The Annual General Inspection conducted on 25-27 October 1966 revealed that the Headquarters was understaffed in light of the assigned mission, the report further stated that the current manning precluded the command and control of all units and activities with the responsiveness required by higher headquarters. The Headquarters is organized under a provisional modification of TD PS-2500-05.

b. Pacific Architects & Engineers, R&U Contractor for RVN, continued to expand their operations during this period. Primary support installations were established at Vung Tau, Long Binh, and Cu Chi. These installations will provide primary administrative, equipment, and material support to other P&E installations within the supported area.

c. A primary part of the Area Engineer's mission is supervision and evaluation of the performance of the R&U contractor. To provide close supervision and control of R&U activities, the Area Engineer has appointed officers to act as Installation Engineers. Each officer reports directly to the Area Engineer on matters concerning the R&U contractor within his installation. They have approval authority of \$1,000 for new work and \$5,000 for maintenance. This enables the Area Engineer to maintain contact with and control over the R&U program down to the installation level.

d. The property disposal mission for the Saigon and Long Binh area was transferred to the 506th Field Depot during this period. The property disposal officer will maintain accountability for property within disposal channels in the Saigon, Long Binh and Vung Tau areas. The CO, VTSAC will maintain operational control of the holding activity at Vung Tau and the CO, 506th Field Depot will maintain operational control over the Saigon and Long Binh holding activities. A DMC has been placed in control of the

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Operational Report (Cont'd)

Long Binh yard, reporting directly to the Property Disposal Officer Saigon.

5. TRAINING:

a. During the reporting period USASUPCOM, Saigon, units continued to stress OJT and unit mission type training. Formal mandatory training was conducted by units.

b. During the month of October several newly activated accelerated units arrived in theater, these units had not completed basic unit training. Master training schedules that had been compiled in CONUS prior to departure of units, were forwarded to 1st Logistical Command. The following units were conducting BUT at the end of the reporting period:

75 Hvy Matl Sup Co (GS)

139 Hvy Matl Sup Co (GS)

563 Hvy Matl Sup Co (GS)

570 Repair Parts Co (GS) (FWD)

6. LOGISTICS:

a. The water purification, water transport, and fire protection detachments attached to the command continue to provide support within the Saigon Support Command Area.

b. The shortage of generators continues to be a problem. Thirty-five 100 KW Taiyo generators are scheduled in, but have not yet arrived. Several units and installations are without adequate electrical power. Repair and maintenance of existing generators is becoming increasingly difficult, due to lack of maintenance float generators and repair parts.

c. The United States Army Mortuary, Vietnam, through coordination with Military Airlift Command, inaugurated transfer of remains to Dover AFB, Delaware. This has been increased, to now include all remains destined for the Eastern seaboard states (All Navy and Air Force remains - East of Mississippi River; all Army remains east of a north-south line generally coinciding with the eastern border of Ohio).

d. The Personal Effects Depot was established effective 1 September and processes all effects of Army deceased except Headquarters, MACV. Services provided include collection, inventory, screening, cleaning, packing and shipping all effects, in accordance with applicable regulations and desires of next-of-kin.

e. During reported period, disposable remains transfer cases were received for testing. A test shipment of disposable cases (weighted with cement) was made to determine durability of this case. This shipment arrived

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Operational Report (Cont'd)

in CONUS without damage. DA has imposed the restriction that these disposable cases will be used only when stocks of standard transfer cases are exhausted. Disposition instructions have been requested for the disposable cases due to levels of standard cases and storage area required for the disposable cases on hand.

SECTION II, PART I - "OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)"

1. PERSONNEL:

Rest and Recuperation

Item: Low utilization rate of Penang and Kuala Lumpur as R&R areas.

Discussion: Penang and Kuala Lumpur were officially opened as American R&R areas in June 1966. From that time until the present, these areas have had the lowest utilization rates (15%) of all R&R sites.

Observation: It is believed that there are too many R&R areas presently being offered to military personnel stationed in Vietnam. Of nine areas available, Hawaii, Bangkok, Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Manila offer a wide selection of areas to accommodate all personnel with a variety of attractions. The low utilization rates of Penang and Kuala Lumpur have been brought to the attention of 1st Logistical Command.

Civic Action Personnel

Item: Shortage of Personnel.

Discussion: This headquarters, by TOE is not authorized officer or enlisted personnel for civic action, although it has a civic action mission.

Observation: This headquarters is operating its civic action section with one officer assigned to it as an additional duty and no enlisted men. Because of this, the overall command civic action program lacks the coordination and control it requires. Staff visits to subordinate units' civic action project sites are virtually impossible. The proposed TD provides for officer and enlisted personnel so that adequate supervision will be available.

2. OPERATIONS:

Security

Item: Lack of security for logistical complexes.

Discussion: The concept of operation experienced by this command does not allow for adequate security of support and logistical facilities. The Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (ASD), for example, has an inventory of approximately 56,000 tons. The perimeter of the ASD is 11.2 miles and the

Operational Report (Cont'd)

storage area has been cleared out of the jungle. Recently, Viet Cong agents infiltrated the ASD and sabotaged a portion of the ammunition stored there. Fortunately, the damage was not as extensive as it might have been had other emplaced charges detonated. This command has no security force to provide minimum security for so large an area. Organic troops are not sufficient in number, even though augmented by USASUPCOM, Saigon security platoons, to perform support duties and provide adequate security for their installations.

Observation: Although the Long Binh ASD is cited, it is not the only complex which requires security, i.e., Camp Davies, the Rice Mill Maintenance complex, the POL bulk supply point, motor pools and similar installations of this command. The type of warfare, insurgency, and sabotage conducted in Vietnam demands maximum security, if critical stocks of material are to be safeguarded and the destruction of these stocks denied to the Viet Cong. Augmentation by additional security forces will enable combat support troops to concentrate on their primary combat support mission as well as on the internal security of their cantonment areas, thereby providing additional security against loss of life and equipment. Additional security forces have been requested through channels.

Communications

Item: Communication between USASUPCOM, Saigon in the Saigon area and outlying groups in the Long Binh and Vung Tau areas.

Discussion: Telephonic means of communication at times proves to be very ineffective.

Observation: A point to point (sole user) means of communications as an alternate has been established and effectively supplements the present inter-connecting commercial type switchboard systems.

3. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

COSTAR

Item: COSTAR Organization of Maintenance Units.

Discussion: The current COSTAR organization of maintenance units does not permit ready fragmentation of those units when necessary to provide direct support to isolated units or activities in the Vietnam Environment.

Observation: In order to support isolated units and activities properly, it has been necessary to draw personnel and equipment from several organizations in order to get the proper mix. This unnecessarily complicates the command and control problem and has an adverse effect on efficiency and morale.

Responsiveness of Maintenance Units

Item: Difficulties with transportation hampers response.

Operational Report (Cont'd)

Discussion: Difficulties caused by units being widely separated and lack secure land lines of communication. This often results in equipment being out of service for days, when in most cases, if personnel and repair parts could be rapidly moved, the equipment could be made serviceable again in a matter of hours. Scheduled air support from other agencies is not responsive to high priority immediate requirements of a support command's maintenance responsibilities.

Observation: Direct support maintenance battalions of a support command and the command group should have access to a support command air section consisting of UH-1B or UH-1D, U8D and CV2 Caribou type aircraft to permit rapid movement over insecure road nets of command group personnel, maintenance personnel and required repair parts for removing major end items from deadline. This authorization is considered urgent. MTOE's are being prepared and will be submitted for an air section to be included in the organization of a direct support maintenance battalion. A letter requesting authority for an air section for this support command has been initiated.

4. INTELLIGENCE: None

5. LOGISTICS:

TOE Mess Equipment

Item: Shortage of field mess equipment for staging incoming units.

Discussion: TOE mess equipment for incoming units is normally shipped on the troop ship as Red TAT. The troops debark and move directly to the unit staging and/or base camp area. Approximately 7 to 14 days elapse before the mess equipment is off loaded, moved to the unit area, uncrated and available for use by the unit. A small amount of mess equipment has been assembled from depot stocks and TOE units for temporary loan to incoming units for their use during the interim period. However, this limited quantity is not adequate. Additionally, due to excessive movement it becomes unserviceable in a very short period of time. Attempts are being made to secure more mess equipment, and to notify incoming units of the need for this equipment.

Observation: Unit mess equipment, to include water trailers, should be shipped, by air if necessary, to arrive a minimum of seven (7) days prior to the arrival of the incoming unit.

Advice Codes

Item: Inadequate advice of supply status.

Discussion: Supply status received by Depots does not show estimated date of release with the unit status codes (BB, EV, etc).

Operational Report (Cont'd)

Observation: To assist logistical personnel and commanders in making sound recommendations and decisions it is considered essential that the estimated date of release be furnished by supply agencies. Letter being sent to monitoring agency responsible for making necessary changes to MILSTRIP Regulation.

Stockage of Chaplain Supply Items

Item: Seven most frequently requisitioned chaplain supply items.

Discussion: The number of chaplain supply line items to be stocked in Vietnam were reduced to the seven most frequently requisitioned. This was done to prevent overstockage of chaplain items in Vietnam with resultant damage due to climatic conditions.

Observation: This will require that all chaplains exercise prior planning in requisitioning of supply items. There are forty-one line items authorized for requisition in Vietnam in addition to the seven stocked in Vietnam. Time will be required to secure them from supply points outside Vietnam. Chaplains have been informed of the necessity for prior planning in determining supply requirements.

Monitoring of Chaplain Supply Items

Item: Monitoring of Chaplain Supplies.

Discussion: Experience has shown that in the past when requisitions have been submitted for certain items, but were not filled in a short time, the requisitions were re-submitted without cancellation. As a result, excessive amounts of some items have been shipped to Vietnam. Because of this, cancellation of requisitions has been necessary.

Observation: A workable system of monitoring chaplain supplies was essential to prevent duplication of requisitioning of supplies. This system is now in operation.

Ammunition Explosion

Item: An entire storage pad of ammunition was destroyed by detonation due to enemy action. The explosion resulted in damage to near by storage pads.

Discussion: During the night of 28 October 1966, area III of the ASD at Long Binh was attacked by a hostile force which employed small arms, automatic weapons, grenades and/or mortars. This force succeeded in entering the area and placed satchel charges with time fuze devices on two ammunition pads, one pad of 1,200 rounds of 8 inch projectiles exploded. The main explosion did not cause sympathetic detonation to adjacent stacks of ammunition. Ammunition was stored in accordance with TM 9-1300-206. Damage incurred was within the limits on which quantity distance tables are based. A significant percentage of stocks of the particular ammunition was destroyed in the action.

Operational Report (Cont'd)

Observation: The validity of the quantity distance tables was verified. Also verified was the requirement to disperse ammunition so that all stocks of a particular ammunition are not destroyed in a single action. Dispersion of stacks of like type ammunition within the depot precluded the loss of the entire quantity of this type of ammunition.

Lack of Equipment and Tools

Item: Government Furnished Equipment for R&U Contract, PA&E.

Discussion: The lack of equipment and tools is the most serious single problem in accomplishment of the R&U mission. The number and quality of employees is improving, and supplies and materials are becoming more readily available; however, full advantage of these gains cannot be taken due to lack of equipment. This deficiency results in excessive overall costs of work accomplished, increases piaster expenditures, delays completion of projects, disrupts job planning, and in general "hamstrings" the contractor's operations. These shortcomings have been reported by the USASUPCOM, Saigon Area Engineer to the contracting officer.

Observation: Effective and efficient performance by the contractor cannot be expected unless necessary items of government furnished equipment are made available. See Schedule "B" attached as Annex A.

Butane Supply

Item: Butane Supply.

Discussion: The supply of butane to meet military requirements exceeds the current in-country commercial capability. This has resulted in two periods when stock availability became critical.

Observation: Out-of-country sources had to be located and stocks brought in by air during the critical periods. Continued resupply action is being taken to bring in more stocks from out-of-country. The commercial source has increased their tank storage capacity by the installation of new tanks.

Contractor Delivery

Item: Commercial Contractor Delivery (Petroleum).

Discussion: Commercial contractor delivery capability, water and land, of POL products has been pushed to its maximum and still falls short of military requirements. The massive buildup with increased requirements could not be programmed for in a civilian system such as is in Vietnam.

Observation: Military petroleum distribution capability has been increased with the addition of one transportation truck company medium (POL) and five bulk petroleum barges under operational control of USASUPCOM, Saigon.

Operational Report (Cont'd)

Additional bulk petroleum barges have been scheduled for delivery to and use by USASUPCOM, Saigon. The addition of one petroleum supply company has enabled the petroleum platoons of the Supply and Service Companies to assume new missions and increase the military distribution capability with less dependency on commercial contractors. One commercial contractor (ESSO) has imported 52 truck chassis for increased distribution capability within Vietnam. A portion of these will be allocated to the III and IV Corps Areas.

6. OTHER:**Construction**

Item: Construction of R&U facilities for Contractor use without project approval.

Discussion: The R&U contractor has constructed several facilities without obtaining project approval. The Area Engineer reported this to the Contracting Officer and requested a determination and finding on whether contractor facilities are subject to the same regulations concerning approval authority, construction standards, and priorities as military facilities.

Observation: R&U contracts should be clearly worded to prevent such situations from occurring, with detailed information included as to regulations and procedures to be followed.

SECTION II, PART II - "RECOMMENDATIONS"

1. PERSONNEL: None

2. OPERATIONS: That military security troops (United States Military Police or Infantry) or Free World Military Force Security personnel be furnished for the security of vulnerable logistical complexes to preclude their infiltration or destruction by Viet Cong.

3. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

a. That the Combat Development Command study the problem of fragmentation of maintenance units when necessary to provide direct support to isolated units or activities with a view to placing more capability within individual COSTAR maintenance units, to include the development of direct support platoons having an all around maintenance capability, e.g., Ordnance, Engineer, Signal and Quartermaster.

b. That consideration be given to providing an air section to support commands having direct support maintenance responsibility to units in the field in a Vietnam type environment. Type of aircraft required to expedite rapid movement of equipment, maintenance personnel, repair parts and command group personnel are UH-1B or UH-1D and Army Aircraft U1-A, Otter.

Operational Report (Cont'd)

4. INTELLIGENCE: None

5. LOGISTICS:

a. That the unit mass equipment of units arriving in Vietnam proceed ahead of unit so as to arrive prior to arrival of main body of unit.

b. Recommend date of release of supplies be furnished to Vietnam depots for planning purposes.

6. OTHER: None

ANNEX:

A - Schedule "B"

Advance Copies Furnished:

CINCUSARPAC (3)

DCCGUSARV (3)

CG, 1st Log Comd (1)

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AVCA OO-O (16 Dec 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)

Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307 17 JAN 1967

TO: Deputy Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307

1. The Operational Report - lessons Learned submitted by the USASC, Saigon for the quarter ending 31 October 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. Reference paragraph 1, Section II, Part I, 1st item: The low R&R utilization rate for Penang and Kuala Lumpur has been brought to the attention of USARV by a letter received from USASC, Saigon, dated 15 Dec 66. This letter was indorsed to USARV, ATTN: Special Services Officer on 22 Dec 66.

3. Reference paragraph 1, Section II, Part I, 2d Item: The personnel shortage currently being experienced by Saigon Support Command is a result of mission essential requirements for which an approved TOE or TDA does not exist. Accordingly, personnel requisitions cannot be submitted for personnel to staff the civic action section since the re-quarantine system is based upon DA approved positions. The only source of personnel to fill this requirement is from available assets of the command.

4. Reference paragraph 2, Section II, Part I, 1st item:

a. Concur with the requirements for security forces to guard critical logistical supply stocks. This headquarters is cognizant of the need for additional personnel for security of the logistical command supply complexes. In this regard, the following actions have been taken:

(1) On 16 Aug 66, this headquarters approved 40 spaces for the 79th Ord Bn, to hire LN personnel for security guard duties.

(2) On 17 Aug 66, this headquarters approved 74 spaces for the 264th S&S Bn to hire LN personnel for security guard duties.

(3) On 20 Sep 66, this headquarters approved 394 spaces for the 29th General Support Group to hire LN personnel for security guard duties.

(4) A letter has been submitted to CG, USARV requesting one infantry security company be assigned to Long Binh to provide security for the ASD.

b. As security personnel become available, they are assigned security missions as appropriate.

17 JAN 1967

AVCA GO-0

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)

5. Reference paragraph 3, Section II, Part I, 1st item: COSTAR DSUs are designed to provide one-stop service at a central location. These units, therefore, do not have composite teams designed to follow and support operations as they are conducted in Vietnam. Concur that CDC investigate the matter in an effort to provide a support operation more suitable for this type of field operation.

6. Reference paragraph 3, Section II, Part I, 2d item: This command recognizes the requirement for a flight section in direct support of support commands and has repeatedly submitted aircraft requirements to USARV with negative results. Currently this headquarters is staffing a request for aviation detachments for each support command. This request for increased manpower spaces will be submitted thru USARV to DA for approval.

7. Reference paragraph 5, Section II, Part I, 1st item: Units deploying to Vietnam have been instructed to ship subject equipment with their advanced party. For reasons unknown to this headquarters, not all units follow these instructions and thereby place a temporary burden on local stockage.

8. Reference paragraph 5, Section II, Part I, 2d item: Normal procedures are for Inventory Control Points to provide the estimated delivery dates for BB, BD and BV Status Codes. These dates are not provided when the Inventory Control Points do not have the information available at the time the cards are dispatched. If sufficient information is not provided on the Initial Status Card, additional follow-up action should be taken by the requisitioner.

9. Reference paragraph 5, Section II, Part I, 5th item: A continuous effort has been made at the Long Binh ASD to disperse stocks among the storage sections as much as possible. It was because of this dispersal that the stock position of items involved in the explosion did not become critical. Currently, efforts are being directed at re-locating the more sensitive ammunition items as far from the perimeter fence as possible.

10. Reference paragraph 5, Section II, Part I, 6th item: The government, because of higher priority commitment of scarce resources, has been unable, through normal military supply channels, to provide the contractor all the equipment required for accomplishing all R&U work. This headquarters has initiated action to issue the Contracting Officer certificates of non-availability, whereupon the contractor will be authorized to procure essential equipment.

17 JAN 1967

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AVCA GO-0

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11. Reference paragraph 5, Section II, Part I, 7th item: Concur with discussion and observation regarding Butane supply except that in one instance full cylinders were obtained from another support command rather than from out-of-country. To supplement contractor capabilities, a 180,000 gallon bulk LPG storage facility and 8 bulk tank trucks are being brought into country for use in the Saigon Support Command. Equipment will be contractor operated under a utility or service type contract.

12. Reference paragraph 5, Section II, Part I, 8th item: Concur with the discussion and observation regarding commercial contractor delivery (Petroleum). US Army Support Command, Saigon has the capability, both in-country and programmed, to supplement the commercial contractor petroleum delivery capability as necessary.


13. Reference paragraph 6, Section II, Part I: Concur. Whereas the contract requires all R&U work to be in strict accord with the AR 415 and AR 420 series, the contract is not clear with regard to facilities for contractor use. The contract will be modified to clarify the matter. In the meantime, the contractor and all subordinate commands have been advised that contractor facilities requirements are subject to the same construction standards and project review, processing and command approval as any other military requirement. In the case in question, this headquarters has directed after-the-fact processing of contractor projects for review and consideration of approval by appropriate command authority.

14. Concur with the basic report as modified. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: Lynx 782/430

1 Incl
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GLENN A. DOYLE
Cdr., AGC
Asst. AG

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deployed from CONUS less their aviation assets. This action is necessary in view of critical shortage of aviation personnel and aircraft. Until this critical shortage is alleviated, priorities of authorization and issue of aircraft will remain with combat units.

e. Reference Paragraph 5, Part I, Section II, Item: Advice Codes, Page 9: Concur. Advice codes should indicate expected release date when they fail to meet required delivery date.

f. Reference Paragraph 5, Part I, Section II, Item: Lack of Equipment and Tools, Page 11: The problem of obtaining sufficient tools and equipment to fulfill R&U contract obligations is recognized. The interim solution to the problem, while not entirely satisfactory, has been to authorize contractor procurement of those items of equipment absolutely essential to contract performance and for which military supply channels have proven non-responsive.

g. Reference Paragraph 6, Part I, Section II, Item: Construction, Page 12: Corrective action taken is considered adequate to resolve the observation on unauthorized construction of R&U facilities.

h. Reference Paragraph 5, Part I, Section II, Item: TOE Mess Equipment, Page 9; and Paragraph 7, 1st Indorsement: Each unit arriving in Vietnam is assigned a sponsoring unit. USARV Regulation 220-10, 26 December 1966, outlines the specific responsibilities of the sponsoring unit which includes administrative and logistical support of the advance party, main body, and rear party.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. J. THORNTON III
1st Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
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AVHGC-DH (16 Dec 66) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 17 FEB 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph 1, Part I, Section II, Item: R&R, Page 7 and Paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement: It has been emphasized to all commands that 100% utilization of R&R allocations is essential. An aggressive program has been initiated, through promotion and command emphasis, to improve the utilization of Penang and Kuala Lumpur allocations.

b. Reference Paragraph 2, Part I, Section II, Item: Lack of Security, Pages 7 and 8; Paragraph 2, Part II, Section II, Page 12; and Paragraph 4a(4), 1st Indorsement: This headquarters is aware of the need for additional security forces for logistical installations. One reinforced security company has been relocated from Cam Ranh Bay to Long Binh since this report was submitted.

c. Reference Paragraph 3, Part I, Section II, Item: COSTAR Organization, Page 8; Paragraph 3, Part II, Section II, Page 12; and Paragraph 4a(4), 1st Indorsement: The problem experienced with tailoring assets taken from COSTAR units to provide maintenance support to isolated units and activities cannot be considered unique to Vietnam or peculiar to COSTAR unit structure. It is a problem that will be encountered wherever there is great dispersion of units and activities requiring support. COSTAR provides as much, if not more, flexibility for tailoring maintenance support as did the former technical service organizational structure utilized in this command until July 1966.

d. Reference Paragraph 3, Part I, Section II, Item: Responsiveness of Maintenance Units, Page 8; and Paragraph 6, 1st Indorsement: The need for organic aircraft in Direct Support maintenance battalions of a support command is recognized; however, criticality of aviation assets and established priorities for issue of aircraft preclude favorable action at this time. Combat Support and Combat Service Support units with TOE authorizations for Army aircraft are being

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GPOP-OT (16 Dec 66)

3d Ind

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31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) - Hq USA Spt Comd, Saigon


HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

15 MAR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



G. L. Ladd
CPT, AGC
Asst AD

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